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PREFACE
While researching this thesis, I drove to Richmond,
Virginia to examine documents at Virginia Commonwealth
University.

Just as I exited the highway in downtown

8Richmond, my car broke down.

I ended up sitting on a

street corner waiting for a tow truck as an elderly
gentleman wearing a red bandanna and not much else tugged on
a cigarette while preaching about sin and temptation to no
one in particular.
This experience helped me recognize that my work up to
that point lacked a complete understanding of how the
automobile became the dominate means of transportation
during the twentieth century.

Getting stranded in Richmond

also convinced me that I had to explore the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.

This was a period, unlike my

own, when locomotives dominated and automotive
transportation was still in its infancy.
reign, however, did not last.

The railroads'

I argue that during the

1950s, the Eisenhower administration neglected mass transit
and ignored railroad objections while promoting highways as
the solution to the nation's transportation problems.

The

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 initiated construction on

iv

the interstate highway system, which played a key role in
creating a society dependent on the automobile.
So as I sat on that street corner in Richmond, I
realized that I had fallen victim to America's dependency on
the automobile as I tried to uncover the root causes of that
reliance.

Had I considered taking a bus or train from

Williamsburg to Richmond?

Did either means of public

transportation run routes that would have been convenient
for me?

The answers to these two questions were no and I

have no idea.

My first (and only) thought was to get in the

car and head up Route 64, which, incidently, was built as
part of the interstate highway system.
My goal became to explore how the automobile
effectively replaced the locomotive as the nation's primary
means of transportation.

Answering this question entailed

looking at how the relationship between business and
government evolved during the first half of the twentieth
century.

I found that throughout this period, many railroad

companies welcomed government efforts to regulate their
industry.

The federal government was also quite willing to

protect the interests of businesses deemed essential to
American economic prosperity.

During the early twentieth

century, the railroads were just such an industry.
The Progressive Era established a relationship between
transportation interests and government that remained in
place during the following decades.
v

This relationship

changed, however, as other methods of transportation
developed.
Railroad regulation had stabilized the industry, but it
also made the railroads unresponsive to competition from
other modes of transportation.

By the 1950s, the railroads

were in decline as trucks and automobiles took away larger
and larger portions of their freight-hauling and passenger
customers.

These industries, along with tire and oil

companies, jelled into a powerful lobby that demanded
government support for a new, federally-funded interstate
highway system to serve intracity as well as intercity
transportation needs.

The railroads opposed this plan

because they understood that a new highway system would
enhance truckers' ability to make deliveries quicker and
cheaper, thus allowing the trucking industry to take even
more business away.
But the "highway lobby" managed to overcome railroad
opposition to the interstate system as well as opposition
from urban planners and other highway critics who advocated
mass transit solutions to urban transportation problems.
The federal government had deserted the railroads for the
trucking, automobile, tire, and petroleum industries because
these interests represented the American economy's future.
This shift in governmental attention helped produce the
Federal Highway Act of 1956, the interstate highway system,

vi

and a society dependent on automotive transportation.
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ABSTRACT
Over the past forty years, the automobile has become
the means of transportation that Americans rely on most. The
1956 decision to build the interstate highway system played
a key role in creating this dependency. Explaining why the
Eisenhower Administration and Congress supported the
interstate system's construction reguires looking first at
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a period
when railroads dominated and automotive transportation was
still in its infancy.
During the late nineteenth century, farmers living on
the newly-settled Great Plains found themselves dependent
upon bankers and railroad companies. Mid-western farmers
turned to the federal government for assistance in creating
equitable business relationships with the nation's
railroads. Most railroads, however, sought to turn reform
efforts in their favor by supporting regulation that
eliminated the competition that had made the railroad
industry so unstable during the late nineteenth century.
Realizing that the railroads were essential to future
economic security and prosperity, the federal government
generally supported railroad efforts to establish regulatory
law that helped stabilize the industry while significantly
increasing profits.
The Progressive Era established a relationship between
transportation interests and government that remained in
place during the ensuing decades. This relationship changed,
however, as other methods of transportation developed. By
the 1950s, the railroads were in decline, behind the surging
trucking and automobile industries. These industries joined
forces with powerful oil and tire companies to form a
powerful lobby that demanded and received government support
for extensive highway construction at the railroads'
expense. The federal government was still willing to protect
and promote the interests of big business, but truckers and
automobiles had replaced the railroads as the most important
providers of transportation.
With these industries leading
the way, Congress approved the construction of the
interstate highway system, which, in turn, helped produce a
society dependent on automobile transportation.
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TRAINS, TRUCKS, AND TRAFFIC JAMS:
THE RISE OF AUTOMOTIVE TRANSPORTATION/ 1880-1956

INTRODUCTION
Over the past forty years the automobile has become the
means of transportation that Americans rely on most.

The

motorcar's dominance becomes evident when one turns on a
television or opens a newspaper.

The glut of automobile

advertisements threatens, at times, to overtake the airwaves
and the pages of print publications.

Another glut, the one

on the nation's highways, further illustrates America's
reliance on the car.

Major traffic jams have become a

common experience for residents of the country's major
cities.
The car's preponderance has raised other concerns and
difficulties.

Smog and acid rain caused, in part, by

automobile exhaust have become persistent problems.

The

automobile's primacy and the resultant demand for foreign
petroleum has also weakened America's position in
international politics.

The 1973 Arab oil embargo and the

Persian Gulf War demonstrated American susceptibility to
economic warfare and the need to protect petroleum produced
overseas.1

!John B. Rae's pioneering work on automotive history,
The American Automobile (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1965) and The Road and the Car in American Life
2

3
These problems raise questions about how the United
States came to depend on automotive transit.

This

dependency cannot be dismissed as simply the result of
America's well-known love affair with the automobile,
although the reasons why Americans fell in love with their
cars is a fascinating topic in itself.

Automobile

manufacturers often advertised their products in ways that
appealed to middle-class sensibilities that emerged during
the first half of the twentieth century.

What could be more

modern, or more masculine, than owning a machine?

Cars also

became powerful symbols of economic and social status that
pulled middle- and upper-class Americans out of the train
station's and passenger compartment's public space and into
the personal, private space of the automobile.

This new

private space separated more affluent white Americans from
the black and immigrant inner city dwellers who continued to
ride public transportation.

The automobile's privacy also

(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Press, 1971) sees the automobile and the expanded
highway network as an egalitarian phenomena that enabled the
burgeoning middle-class to escape the pressures of city
life. For a more critical appraisal of the automobile, see
James J. FIink, The Car Culture (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1975 and The
Automobile Age (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Press, 1988). Daniel Yergin's, The
Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1991) examines the international
consequences of America's increasing dependency on foreign
oil during the twentieth century while James A. Bill's The
Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of Iranian-American
Relations (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press,
1988) explores American efforts to assure its control of
Iranian oil and the consequences of these efforts.
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provided a new location for sexual expression that
significantly changed courtship rituals among young people.
But exploring these aspects of the automobile's ascent
will have to wait because a full understanding of the
automobile's success cannot be achieved with exploring the
relationship between business and government during the
twentieth century's first half.

During this time period,

the federal government's transportation policies concerning
highways and railroads evolved to create a business
environment that favored automotive transportation.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower's 1956 plan to build the
interstate highway system represented a major shift in
American transportation policy because the federal
government would pay approximately 9 0 percent of the new
interstate system's construction costs.

The trucking

industry led the tire, petroleum, and automobile industries
in fighting for congressional approval of the interstate
highway bill.

Truckers saw the advantage a new, federally-

funded highway system would give their industry and pounced
on the opportunity to exploit the Eisenhower
administration's highway proposal.2

2The most important works on the interstate highway
system are Mark H. Rose, Interstate: Express Highway
Politics, 1939-1989 (Knoxville, Tennessee: University of
Tennessee Press, 1990) and Bruce E. Seely, Building the
American Highway System: Engineers as Policymakers
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987). Rose and
Seely provide an intense analysis of the legislative process
the created the Federal Highway Act of 195 6. Richard 0.

Railroad owners, however, opposed a federally
subsidized interstate highway system.

For almost thirty

years, truckers had succeeded in taking business away from
the railroads and by the 1950s, they presented a major
threat to the railroads' future prosperity.

Railroad owners

promoted the idea that their inability to compete with
truckers originated in the federal government's late
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century efforts to regulate
the railroad industry.

Railroad leaders argued that the

trucking industry encountered less government interference,
which tilted the field of competition in the truckers'
favor.3
But an examination of the relationship between the
railroad industry and government during the Progressive Era
tells a different story.

In fact, many railroad owners and

Davies, The Age of Asphalt: The Automobile, the Freeway, and
the Condition of Metropolitan America (Philadelphia: J. B.
Lippincott and Company, 1975) examines the more recent
consequences of the highways' and automobiles'
proliferation. Published immediately after the Arab oil
embargo of 1973, The Age of Asphalt criticizes the
shortsightedness of creating a one-dimensional
transportation system dependent on an unlimited supply of
cheap, foreign oil. Less successful, but still useful
sources are A. Q. Mowbray's Road to Ruin (Philadelphia:
Lippincott, Inc., 19 69) and Helen Leavitt, SuperhighwaySuperhoax (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company,
1970).
3Albro Martin, Railroads Triumphant: The Growth,
Rejection, and Rebirth of a Vital American Force (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992), 361-72; George Hilton, The
Transportation Act of 1958: A Decade of Experience
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1969), 1015.
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public officials supported government regulation as a way of
stabilizing the industry.
During the 1880s and 1890s, the railroad industry
conducted business in an unstable and ferociously
competitive environment.

The industry's instability led to

inefficient business practices that spawned bankrupt lines.
The railroad industry also faced criticism from reformers
who sought to challenge monopolistic business practices
through government action.

As the call for regulation

became louder and louder, railroad leaders sought a method
for using reform sentiment to their advantage.

If popular

opinion demanded regulation, then the railroads would
exploit that sentiment to end destructive rivalries and
restore order, stability, and most of all, profits.
Early twentieth-century progressives demanded
regulation, but for different reasons.

The Second

Industrial Revolution spawned large railroad companies and
the highly competitive conditions within this industry.
Industrial capitalism also plugged farmers on the newlysettled Great Plains into the world market economy.

These

farmers found themselves dealing with and dependent upon
bankers and railroads companies that often took advantage of
them.

The inability to acquire credit on reasonable terms

and the unreasonable fees railroads charged for shipping
grain and produce to market led to the Populist Revolt of
the 1890s and the rural reform politics of the Progressive

Era.

Mid-Western farmers and other shippers turned to their

state representatives and the federal government for
assistance in establishing equitable business relationships
with the nations' railroads.4
Progressives, many of whom held public office, wanted
to reform large corporate monopolies because these
monopolies limited economic opportunity and created a big
business-dominated political system.

Correcting these

inequities would require government supervision of large
corporations to ensure that all Americans could enjoy the
highest degree of political, economic, and social freedom.
Hence, support for regulation existed within the railroad
industry and the progressive movement.

Progressive

animosity toward the railroads, therefore, did not mean that
railroad owners attempted to block all efforts to regulate
their industry.5

4See Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: Bryan to
F. D. R . (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1955), Lee Benson,
Merchants, Farmers, and Railroads: Railroad Regulation and
New York Politics, 1850-1887 (New York: Russell and Russell,
1955), Richard Hofstadter, ed., The Progressive Movement,
1900-1915 (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1963), introduction, and Morton Keller, Regulating a
New Economy: Public Policy and Economic Change in America,
1900-1913 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1990) for discussions of farmers' involvement in the
progressive movement.
5Some of the most important studies of the American
Progressive movement and its efforts to regulate industry
are Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A
Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916 (New York:
Free Press, 19 63); Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: Bryan to
F. D . R; Robert H. Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform: A Study of
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Over a twenty-year period covering the administrations
of Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft and Woodrow
Wilson, the federal government implemented regulation that
created a stable, successful, and almost competition-free
railroad industry.6

But the federal government enacted

these regulations when the railroads possessed a virtual
monopoly over American transportation.

Regulation

supporters did not recognize the harm these controls might
cause when other transportation systems developed the
ability to compete with the mighty locomotive.

By the

1950s, the railroads were losing a significant portion of

the American Progressive Movement (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 19 62); Robert H. Wiebe, The Search
for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967); Lewis
L. Gould, ed., The Progressive Era (Syracuse, New York:
Syracuse University Press, 1974). For an overview of the
Progressive Era, see Nell Irvin Painter, Standing at
Armageddon: The United States, 1877-1919 (New York: W. W.
Norton and Company, 1987) . For more recent interpretations,
see Andrew Feffer, The Chicago Pragmatists and American
Progressivism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
1993) ; William A. Link, The Paradox of Southern
Progressivism (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of
North Carolina Press, 1992); Robert David Johnson, The Peace
Progressives and American Foreign Relations (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); Morton Keller,
Regulating A New Economy: Policy and Social Change in
America, 1900-1933 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1994).
6Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916 provides an
excellent analysis of government action to implement
regulation during this time period. Also see Wiebe, Business
and Reform: A Study of the Progressive Movement, Wiebe, The
Search for Order, 1877-1920, Theodore E. Keeler, Railroads,
Freight, and Public Policy (Washington, D .C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1983), chapters 2-4; Albro Martin, Enterprise
Denied: The Origins of the Decline of American Railroads,
1897-1917 ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).
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their business to the trucking industry and a new,
federally-funded interstate highway system would only
enhance the trucker's ability to take business away from the
railroads.7
During the congressional debate over the interstate
highway system, the railroad industry found that it no
longer could dictate federal transportation policy.
Railroads were the nineteenth century's mode of
transportation.

The automobile and the truck (along with

the airplane), however, dominated the twentieth century.

As

a result, the railroads along with those who advocated mass
transit alternatives for providing urban transportation and
questioned the highway's ability to help evacuate cities in
case of nuclear attack lost their campaign against the
interstate highway system.

Although the decision to build

the interstate highway system contained some questionable
reasoning on the Eisenhower administration's part, the
trucking, automotive, oil, and tire industries convinced the
administration and Congress that massive highway
construction was absolutely necessary for the country's
future economic prosperity and military defense.

Hence, the

federal government had a consistent policy of promoting
transportation and business interests deemed essential to
economic prosperity.

Government officials obliged

7Hilton, The Transportation Act of 1958: A Decade of
Experience, 10-15.
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transportation and business interests in the 195 0s just as
they had during the century's first two decades when
enacting railroad regulation.

By 1956, however, the

businesses that attracted the government's attention had
changed.

CHAPTER 1
The Railroads, Progressivism, and Regulation
Over the past thirty years, historians have modified
their views of efforts to regulate the railroad industry.
The traditional position asserted that the railroads opposed
federal control.

In recent years, revisionists have

questioned this argument.

They suggest that government

regulation was, in part, intended to stabilize the industry
after its near collapse in the 1880s and early 1890s.
Revisionists also maintain that railroad owners and
executives generally favored federal efforts to obtain some
control over their industry.1
Confrontational and antagonistic best describe the
traditional view of government-railroad relations in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century. See I. L.
Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission, 5 vols. (New
York: Commonwealth Fund, 1931-1937) I; Albro Martin,
Enterprise Denied: The Origins of the Decline of American
Railroads, 1897-1917 ( New York: Columbia University Press,
1971); Albro Martin, Railroads Triumphant: The Growth,
Rejection, and Rebirth of a Vital American Force (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992). For an alternative view, see
Paul W. MacAvoy, The Economic Effects of Regulation: The
Trunk-Line Railroad Cartels and the Interstate Commerce
Commission before 1900 (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1965) and
Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965),
especially chapters 1 and 2. For a refutation of Kolko, see
Robert W. Harbeson, "Railroads and Regulation: Conspiracy or
Public Interest?" in Robert F. Himmelberg, ed., Growth of
the Regulatory State, 1990-1917: State Federal Regulation of
11
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The railroads' incredible growth during the latter half
of the nineteenth century coupled with the surge in
speculation and instability within the industry help explain
the railroads' endorsement of government regulation.

The

Industrial Revolution, which provided the capability to
build railways, also fostered their development.

As the

American economy expanded during the nineteenth century, the
demand for improved transportation also increased.

The

expanding nineteenth-century economy made every segment of
society— from farmers who wanted their produce delivered
quickly and cheaply to businessmen who wanted their
factories' goods shipped to market or to either coast for
shipment overseas— grew dependent on locomotive
transportation.

Accordingly, railways became indispensable

to American economic prosperity.2
Despite the essential nature of their existence, the
railroads experienced a variety of problems.

Railroad

construction soared during the 187 0s and 1880s.

Speculators

purposely built new lines parallel to existing lines because

Railroads and Other Enterprises, vol. 3 of Business and
Government in America Since 1870
(New York: Garland
Publishing, Inc., 1994), 128-141.
2See Alfred D. Chandler, ed. Railroads: The Nation's
First Big Business (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World,
19 65) and Robert W. Fogel, Railroads and American Economic
Growth: Essays in Econometric History (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1964). Chandler's work stresses
the importance of the railroads to nineteenth-century
economic growth while Fogel's book questions that
importance.
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they knew the original lines' owners would buy the new ones
for an inflated price in order to limit competition.
Nevertheless, railways and rail companies multiplied
rapidly, causing fierce rivalries between companies.
Special rates, free passes for large shippers, low rates on
bulk freight, and rebates— secretly negotiated reductions
below published prices— became commonplace.

Intense

rivalries also caused bankruptcy and mergers that fostered
inefficiency.
their success.

As a result, the railroads failed to maintain
The panic of 1893 and the ensuing depression

could not have come at a worse time.

Many more rail lines

went bankrupt, and those that survived teetered on the brink
of extinction.3
These remaining companies sought the assistance of
several prominent investment bankers.

J. Pierpont Morgan's

New York-based banking house lent a substantial amount of
money to railroad owners.

In return, the railroads

acquiesced to Morgan's vision of the industry's future
configuration.

J. P. Morgan despised competition.

He

arranged a traffic-sharing agreement among the remaining
railroad companies and collected a $1 million fee for doing
so.

Morgan also eliminated rebates and other industry

3MacAvoy, The Economic Effects of Regulation and Kolko,
Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916, chapters one and two.
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features that fostered competition.4
The railroad industry, however, remained relatively
competitive throughout the 1890s.

The 1893 Depression

stimulated rate wars, as railways struggled desperately to
remain afloat in an ever-shrinking market.

In 1887, there

were twenty-eight railroads with over a thousand miles of
track.

By 1900, forty-eight systems eclipsed the thousand-

mile mark.

A significant number of these lines remained

independent of Morgan and managed to compete among
themselves and with the railways that constituted J. P.
Morgan's dynasty.5
Like Morgan, many railroad owners wanted to eliminate
even this lingering competition.

They turned to the

government as a two-fold solution that would stifle
competition while solving the industry's persistent
financial problems.

The continuous decline in shipping

charges led railroad owners to consider using the federal
government to stabilize rates after pools— voluntary rate
and market share agreements between several lines— failed to
produce positive results.

Such agreements' major

4Vincent P. Carosso, The Morgans: Private International
Bankers, 1854-1913 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1987), chapter ten discusses Morgan's
involvement in the railroad industry.
5United States Industrial Commission, Report of the
Industrial Commission on Transportation (Washington, D. C . :
Government Printing Office, 1900), IV, 296-298; U. S. Bureau
of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States,
Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D. C . : GPO, 1960), 429.
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shortcoming was that, in an industry as cut-throat as
railroading, one company or another would inevitably violate
a voluntary rate arrangement.6

The federal government's

involvement in setting and enforcing rates would provide
industry stability while working to reduce competition.
These solutions, however, conflicted with laissez-faire
capitalism and free enterprise, two ideas that American
businesses often supported.

Moreover, business leaders like

Andrew Carnegie connected the doctrine of Social Darwinism
to the business world.

Social Darwinism— philosopher

Herbert Spencer's application of Charles Darwin's theory of
evolution to social relations— argued that unrestrained
competition was simply natural selection's way of weeding
out unfit businesses.

Railroad owners, however, abandoned

laissez-faire capitalism and Social Darwinism when their
companies faced bankruptcy.

Most railroad men were not

interested in the intellectual significance of allowing
government regulation; most were more concerned with solving
immediate economic problems in the quickest manner
possible.7
6Martin, Enterprise Denied: The Origins of the Decline
of American Railroads, 1897-1917, 36-37 describes pooling
arrangements and why they failed.
7See Andrew Carnegie, The Gospel of Wealth and Other
Timely Essays, edited by Edward C. Kirkland (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 19 62). On Social
Darwinism, see Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in
American Thought, 1860-1915 (New York: George Braziller,
Inc., 1959); Carl N. Degler, In Search of Human Nature: The
Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought
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The progressive movement, of course, concerned itself
with a variety of issues.

Turn-of-the-century reformers

addressed social and cultural as well as economic and
political problems.

Progressivism also had different

meanings in different regions of the country.

For instance,

rural progressives sought to rectify the injustices
inflicted on farmers during the late nineteenth century.
These farmers fed America's expanding work force and
generated the foreign capital needed to finance
industrialization, but they had not enjoyed the economic
prosperity their toil had helped create.

Farmers had little

protection from railroad exploitation, the high cost of
credit, and the burden of taxation.

The grievances that

kindled the Populist uprising of the 1890s had not been
forgotten, and farmers saw the progressive movement of as a
way of addressing these issues.

At the same time, the urban

areas that expanded with American industry were also centers
of poverty, decay, and corruption.

According to many

reformers, these problems stemmed from America's rapid
industrialization, the influx of immigrants from Southern
and Eastern Europe, and the resulting decline in national
morality. When critiquing industrialization, both rural and
urban progressives expressed hostility toward the large

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Robert C.
Bannister, Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in AngloAmerican Social Thought (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1979).
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corporations that industrial capitalism had created.8
These criticisms, however, did not mean that railroad
owners automatically became progressivism's adversary.

Not

all railroad leaders supported government initiatives to
regulate their businesses and those who did could not always
agree on the form that regulation should take.

Railroads

differed in many respects including their size, location,
and specialization in passenger travel or hauling freight.
These characteristics helped determine the various
railroads' stance on regulation and differences between
railroads often created disagreement.

Nevertheless, most

railroad owners never wavered from the principle that
regulation was a positive step for their industry.

Railroad

owners simply had different reasons for wanting to obtain

8Many studies discuss the various reform efforts of the
Progressive Era. For an overview of social reform, see
Morton Keller, Regulating a New Society: Public Policy and
Social Change in America, 1900-1933 (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994). On the
plight of immigrants, see Jacob A. Riis, How the Other Half
Lives: Studies Among the Tenements of New York (New York:
Dove Publications, 1971, 1890). On progressivism's affects
on American diplomacy, see Robert David Johnson, The Peace
Progressives and American Foreign Relations (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995). On women's
suffrage, see Nancy F. Cott, The Grounding of Modern
Feminism (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press,
1987). On political reform efforts, see Robert M. Crunden,
Ministers of Reform: The Progressives' Achievements in
American Civilization (New York: Basic Books, 1982). On the
muckrakers, see Harold S. Wilson, McClure's Magazine and the
Muckrakers (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1970). On the labor movement, see Harold Livesay,
Samuel Gompers and Organized Labor in America Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1978).
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the same objectives as progressives.9
The late nineteenth century unleashed intense public
hostility toward large corporations, or trusts.

This

animosity spurred Congress to take action and, in 1887, the
legislature passed the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA).

The

measure prohibited discrimination against shippers and
localities, made charging more for a shorter haul than for a
longer haul illegal, outlawed pools, and dictated the
publication of all shipping fees.

The new law also created

the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to oversee railroad
activity.10
Sentiment among railroad owners toward the Interstate
Commerce Act was mixed.

Many did not approve of short-long

haul clause while others disagreed with the clause against
pooling because they believed that such agreements helped
maintain stable shipping rates.

The railroads, however,

only had to live with the short-long haul clause until 1897.
In that year, the Supreme* Court overturned the prohibitions
against long-short haul discrimination.11
9Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916,
introduction; Robert H. Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform: A
Study of the American Progressive Movement (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962), 212-219.
10,1An Act To Regulate Commerce" (No Public Law Number,
February 4, 1887) 24 United States Statues at Large, 379387.
nI. L. Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission, 5
vols. (New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1931-1937), I, 24;
Stuart Daggett, Principles of Inland Transportation (New
York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 192 8); Robert H.
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The Interstate Commerce Commission also frightened some
railroad men.

The ICA contained several vague passages,

which the Commission would have to clarify.

Therefore,

railroad owners expressed concern over President Grover
Cleveland planned appointees to the Interstate Commerce
Commission.12
Cleveland's choice of Thomas M. Cooley as the new
commission's chairman eased the railroad owners' anxiety.

A

lawyer, Cooley had made his reputation as a theorist of
government action's constitutional limitations.
Furthermore, he had worked as a railroad administrator and
knew the challenges that the industry faced as it headed
toward a new century.

Cooley's opinions and actions did not

always support the railroads' position, but his tenure as
chair set the stage for the relatively amenable relationship
that developed between the railroads and the ICC over the
ensuing two decades.13
As calls for reform became louder, Congress passed more
railroad regulation.

Three times during the new century's

Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and
Wang, 1967), 53; Ari and Olive Hoogenboom, A History of the
ICC: From Panacea to Palliative (New York: W. W. Norton and
Company, Inc., 1976), 21-23.
12Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916, 46-48.
13Thomas McIntyre Cooley, A Treatise on the
Constitutional Limitations which Rest upon the Legislative
Power of the States of the American Union (New York: De Capo
Press, 1868); Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916,
47-48.
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first decade, Congress increased regulation, but, contrary
to popular opinion at the time, President Theodofe Roosevelt
was not an avid regulation supporter.14

In his first

message to Congress, TR acknowledged that "the great
corporations known as trusts are in certain features and
tendencies hurtful to the general welfare."

"It is true,"

he continued, that these corporations perpetrated "real and
grave evils . . .

and a resolute and practical effort must

be made to correct these evils."

Nevertheless, Roosevelt

believed that Congress had to act cautiously when
implementing regulation because "the captains of industry
who have driven the railroad system across this continent
have on the whole done great good to our people. Without
them the material development of which we are so proud could
never have taken place."

A cautious approach was also

necessary because "it cannot too often be pointed out that
to strike with ignorant violence at the interests of one set
of men almost inevitably endangers the interests of all."15
Roosevelt agreed that trusts hurt small businesses and
limited individual opportunity, but he also believed that
large corporations generated essential production and
14Richard Hofstadter, ed., The Progressive Movement,
1900-1915 (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1963), 11-12; Lewis L. Gould, The Presidency of
Theodore Roosevelt (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas
Press, 1991), 156.
15Quotations from Messages and Papers of the President,
1789-1904, James Richardson, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Bureau
of National Literature and Art, 1905) 10, 422-423.
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industrial growth that helped secure the country's future
economic success.
The reform efforts of the early twentieth century,
however, compelled Roosevelt to seek government regulation
of the railroads.

Progressivism's popularity in the Mid-

and Far West and the support federal action received from
reform governors like Robert M. "Fighting Bob" La Follette
of Wisconsin and Hiram Johnson of California also influenced
Roosevelt's stand on regulation.16
In 1906, La Follette made an impassioned, pro
regulation speech before the U. S. Senate.

He had just won

election to a Senate seat and arrived in Washington as
Congress began debating a piece of regulatory legislation
that eventually became the Hepburn Act.
contended,

La Follette

"The farmer knows that there is no open, free

competitive market for anything he may produce.

He knows he

must accept the prices fixed by the beef trust and the
elevator combination.

He knows that both of these

organizations have been given control of the markets by the
railroads."

Monopolies, La Follette continued, created

injustice because people were forced to use the railroads to
"market the products of his capital and his labor . . .

on

the terms fixed by the railway corporation. Or to say it
16See David P. Thelen, Robert La Follette and the
Insurgent Spirit (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 197 6)
and George E. Mowry, The California Progressives, (Berkeley,
California: University of California Press, 1951) for
discussions of La Follette and Johnson.
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arrogantly and brutally, as did the president of the
Louisville and Nashville Railway Company in his testimony
before the ICC, that the public can pay the charge which the
railroad demands,

'or it can walk.'"

La Follette believed

regulation legislation was extremely important because "the
subject with which it deals goes to the very heart of the
whole question.

Out of railroad combination with monopoly

and its power over legislation comes the perilous relation
which Mr. Justice Brewer says 'lifts the corporation into a
position of constant danger and menace to republican
institutions. '"17
Indeed, Congress designed the Hepburn Act (1906), along
with the Elkins Act (1903) and Mann-Elkins Act (1910), to
promote fairness within the railroad industry.

The Elkins

Act made shippers receiving discriminatory favors, such as
rebates, subject to penalties and held railroad companies,
not just their chief officers, responsible for violations.
The act also made charging higher rates than those published
a misdemeanor offense subject to court injunction.18
The Hepburn Act increased the size of the ICC and gave

17Congress, Senate, Regulation of Railroad Rates, 59th
Congress, First Session, Congressional Record, vol. 40, no.
6, daily ed., (April 23, 1906), S5722-23.
18"An Act To Further Regulate Commerce with Foreign
Nations and Among the States" (Public Law 104, February 19,
1903), 32 United States Statues at Large, 847-849; George
Hilton, The Transportation Act of 1958: A Decade of
Experience (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press,
1969), 4.
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the commission authority to fix railroad shipping charges.
Hepburn also made all ICC rate decisions binding, meaning
that rail companies' only course of action was to appeal an
unfavorable ruling in court.

The Mann-Elkins Act, which

received support from Roosevelt's hand-picked successor,
William Howard Taft, created a special commerce court to
hear railroad appeals of ICC decisions.19
Small farmers and merchants who formed the progressive
movement's backbone in the Mid- and Far West responded
enthusiastically to this legislation.

But many railroad

owners and pro-railroad congressmen also endorsed these
initiatives.

The Elkins Act reflected the railroads'

distaste for rebating.20

Alexander J. Cassatt, president

of the Pennsylvania Railroad, made ending rebates his
personal mission.

He took a seven-year hiatus from

railroading during the 1890s because the Pennsylvania
refused to approve his plans to establish discipline within
the Eastern railways.

Upon returning to the business,

Cassatt fought for and succeeded in bringing stability to

19,,An Act to Amend an Act Entitled 'An Act To Regulate
Commerce' Approved February 4, 1887 . . ." (PL 337, June 29,
1906) 34 United States Statutes at Large, 584-595; "An Act
To Create a Commerce Court . . . " (PL 218, June 28, 1910)
36 United States Statues at Large, 539-557; Hilton, The
Transportation Act of 1958, 4.
20Hilton, The Transportation Act of 1958, 4.
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the eastern lines.21
Even the Hepburn Act, which Roosevelt cited in the 1912
presidential election as an example of his progressivism,
received mild support from some railroad leaders or was
ignored altogether.22

The act's most important provisions

extended rate-making powers to the ICC and made rate
decisions appealable only in a court of law.

The Senate

debated these two stipulations extensively because many
senators questioned their constitutionality.

The bill's

detractors argued that granting the ICC rate-making powers
would give a regulatory agency legislative capacity.

If the

railroad industry had decided to organize against the
Hepburn Act, they certainly would have had potent ammunition
with which to criticize the bill.23

But Railroad World, a

trade publication that championed federal regulation, saw
the Hepburn Act as non-threatening.

The publication

commented: "This Hepburn measure appears at present to be
far milder than has been anticipated.

If the amendments

which are apparently insisted upon by the Senate . . . are
adopted we can see nothing in the measure threatening the

21George H. Burgess and Miles C. Kennedy, Centennial
History of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 1846-1946
(Philadelphia: 1949), 461.
22Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform, 55-56.
23Ibid., 132-38; Hilton, The Transportation Act of 1958,
4-5.
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interests of the railroads."24
Some even believed that the railroad industry had
inspired the Hepburn bill.

Senator Isidor Rayner of

Maryland told the Senate that the railroads "suggested" key
elements of the bill.

Rayner's statement was difficult to

prove, but this did not stop the New York Press from
declaring that "[Rayner's comment] explains why the railroad
lobbies did not raise a note of public or private protest
against the Hepburn bill in the House."25

The railroads

probably did not have any direct control over the Hepburn
bill's content and the bill's defenders used progressive
ideas as the main rationale for passing the Act.

Still,

some supporters of the Hepburn Act did not want to punish
the railroads, which were still intent on stabilizing their
industry and saw expanding the ICC's powers to control rates
as a way of accomplishing this goal.

A more realistic

appraisal would regard the Hepburn Act as a popular piece of
progressive legislation that railroads also supported.
Some railroad leaders also defended the Mann-Elkins Act
despite President Taft's support of the bill.

Taft had a

trust-busting reputation and in the 1908 presidential
campaign, spoke of strengthening the ICC's power to control
exorbitant rates while the Republican platform also
24Railroad World L (February 9, 1906), 123, quoted in
Kolko, 134.
25New York Press, March 16, 1906, quoted in Kolko, 138139.
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contained language to this effect.

In an election year this

anti-railroad, anti-trust rhetoric gained Taft progressive
Republican support.

After his election, though, Taft hinted

that he supported a reduction in the ICC's powers.

Taft's

reversal put railroad leaders at ease, reassuring them that
his railroad policy would not unleash anything radical or
unexpected.26
The railroads' positive relationship with the federal
government continued even after Democrat Woodrow Wilson
entered office in 1912.

Wilson's emphasis on business

competition and small government seemed to conflict with
railroad interests.

At first, Wilson did not pay a great

deal of attention to railroad affairs, but his appointment
of pro-rail conservatives to the ICC in 1913 and 1914 won
approval from railroad owners.

During this same period,

railroad profits dropped precipitously and many within the
industry began calling for a rate increase.27

Wilson

indicated his willingness to heed the railroads in a speech
before Congress on January 20, 1914: "The antagonism between
business and government is over.

. . . The Government [sic]

and business men are ready to meet each other halfway in a
common effort to square business methods with public opinion

26Wiebe, The Search for Order, 202-03.
27Wiebe, Businessmen and Reform, 140-142.
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and the law."28

Wilson was not speaking specifically about

railroads, but his comments left the impression that he
would listen to the industry's concerns.
Wilson's approval of shipping-interest lawyer Louis
Brandeis's efforts to open railroad accounting books during
the ICC's hearings on a proposed 5 percent rate increase
strained this congenial atmosphere.

But the ICC granted the

increase in five states (the ICC eventually extended the
increase to the entire Eastern territory), with Wilson's
appointees leading the way to approval.

Railroad profits

increased significantly, but the "Five Percent Case" was
important for one other reason: the ICC's decision expressed
a duty to guarantee the railroads a "living wage."
Essentially, the ICC promised the industry a profit as long
as they provided quality service at reasonable rates.

The

Interstate Commerce Commission's purpose had gone beyond
just regulating the railroads to include protecting and
assisting private business in securing a profit.29
Railroad interests also defeated state regulation
during Wilson's presidency.

The rails wanted ICC rules to

supersede any regulation that individual states might enact.
Between 1902 and 1915, state legislatures passed almost

2SThe Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, III, edited by
Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1926) 82, 84-85.
29Kolko, 210-211.
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1,800 laws containing-railroad regulation.30

Trying to

satisfy frequently contradictory regulations was
extraordinarily difficult.

Furthermore, the railroads

encountered far more hostility in state legislatures than
they did when dealing with the ICC.

Railroad leaders had

worked hard to cultivate a harmonious relationship with the
ICC and did not want overzealous state lawmakers to
undermine this alliance.

In their efforts to confirm the

ICC's position as the supreme being of regulation, railroad
leaders denied any effort to circumvent the positive
relationship between their industry and the federal
government.31
In Houston E & W Texas Railroad Co. v. U. S.

(the

Shreveport case) and the 1913 Minnesota rate cases, the
Supreme Court sided with the railroads on state versus
federal regulation but did not rescind the states' power to
enact regulatory legislation.

As Wilson campaigned for a

second term in office, he called for a complete
30Interstate Commerce Commission, Statistics of Railways
in the United States, 1916 (Washington: GPO, 1918), 98.
31See Mansel Griffiths Blackford, "Businessmen and the
Regulation of Railroads and Public Utilities in California
During the Progressive Era," in Robert F. Himmelberg, ed.,
Growth of the Regulatory State, 1990-1917: State Federal
Regulation of Railroads and Other Enterprises, Vol. 3 of
Business and Government in America Since 1870 (New York:
Garland Publishing, Inc., 1994); Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph
of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History,
1900-1916 (New York: The Free Press, 1963), 5-6; Kolko,
Railroads and Regulation, 89-90, 202-225 for discussion of
state efforts to regulate the railroad industry and the
industry's desire to frustrate these efforts.
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investigation of state versus federal railroad regulation.
Republicans went even further.

In their 1916 platform, the

GOP called for complete federal control, by constitutional
amendment if necessary.32
World War I put this debate on hold.

Wilson seized

control of the rails, which transported personnel and
materials for the war effort.

The Wilson administration

rewarded the railroad industry for its military service with
the Federal Railroad Control Act of 1918.

The ICC followed

with a 2 5 percent freight rate increase that rapidly
expanded railroad coiffures.

Between 1916 and 192 0, freight

revenue per ton-mile rose from 72 cents to $1.07 and
operating revenue from $2.7 billion to $5.3 billion.33
The Transportation Act of 192 0 was also popular among
railroad owners, although some of the largest, strongest
railroads did object to the Act's recapture clause.

The

clause ordered all carriers earning more than 6 percent of
the value of its property to pay one-half of the excess
profits into an ICC fund for loans to smaller lines.

The

provision's intention was to aid smaller, weaker lines that
could not turn a profit when following an ICC rate schedule
established for all railroads.

The stronger lines did not

32George G. Reynolds, The Distribution of Power to
Regulate Interstate Carriers Between Nations and States (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1928) 137-42, contains a
discussion of these two cases and their significance.
33Kolko, 228.
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want to pay into this fund, but other provisions of the Act
helped mitigate their dissatisfaction with the recapture
clause.34

The Transportation Act established a 5.5 to 6

percent profit margin as the minimum standard for railroad
prosperity while furthering the 5 percent decision's
principle of guaranteeing railroads a profit.

The act also

enlarged the ICC's membership, permitted pooling, gave the
Commission power to set minimum fees, and established
federal regulation's superiority in the areas of rate
preferences and discrimination.

Under the Wilson

administration, railroad owners completed creating the
conditions deemed desirable when the push for stability
through federal regulation began forty years earlier.35
When this quest began, turmoil and cut-throat
competition that ate away at profits plagued the railroad
industry.

Realizing their desperate situation, rail leaders

attempted to eliminate rivalries.

Federal regulation became

the means of achieving this goal.

In the process, the ICC

became a shield for the railroads against hostile local

34I . L. Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission, 5
vols. (New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1931-1937), I, 211-15;
Stuart Daggett, Principles of Inland Transportation (New
York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1928), 826-849;
William Norris Leonard, Railroad Consolidation Under the
Transportation Act of 1920 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1946), 59-60, 217.
35,,An Act To Provide for Federal Control of the
Railroads and Systems of Transportation . . . "
(Transportation Act of 1920) (PL 152, February 28, 1920) 41
United States Statues at Large, 456-499.
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lawmakers.
Moreover, government regulation did not represent
progressivism.

The progressive movement sought to make

society's dominant- economic entities accountable to the
people through government regulation and attempted to
balance economic power within the country.

But Congress and

the various presidents who enacted railroad regulation
between 1887 and 1920 did not always intend to achieve these
goals.

These men sought to bring order to a chaotic

industry.

Therefore, progressivism played an essential but

incidental role in creating railroad regulation.

Popular

sentiment declared that monopolies like the railroad
industry posed a threat to the average individual's
economic, political, and social freedom.

But when the

nation's politicians looked at the railroads, they saw an
economic force that had played a key role in generating
unprecedented economic prosperity.

Because the railroads

were the nation's only transportation system capable of
handling the demands of an ever-expanding economy, Congress
and Presidents Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson saw regulation as
a way to guarantee the survival and prosperity of the
railroad industry and the nation.

Along the path to this

goal, the executive and legislative branches indulged in
rhetoric that expressed the desire to enhance individual
opportunity and promote the general welfare.

Implicit in

this rhetoric was the idea that the general welfare would be

32
served if government protected the railroads' welfare.
Railroad regulation created an industry guaranteed a
profit, but also made the rails exceedingly inflexible and
unresponsive to competition.

In the 1910s and 192 0s, this

inflexibility was inconsequential because competition had
been virtually eliminated.

But as other forms of

transportation developed, government requirements such as
rate publication and the restriction on changing these rates
for a thirty-day period became serious obstacles to the
railroads' ability to compete.

Just as the railroads

succeeded in guaranteeing their future success, another mode
of transit— the motor vehicle— began to mature.

Eventually,

the changing nature of America's transportation demands
would generate a marked decrease in federal concern for the
railroad industry while creating enthusiastic federal
support for highway construction aimed at meeting both
interstate and urban transportation demands.36

36See Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, Problems of the Railroads, Part 1, 85th
Congress, 2d Session (GPO: Washington, D.C.: 1958) for a
full discussion of how regulation hindered the railroads'
ability to compete with other forms of transportation.

CHAPTER II
Roads to the Future:
The Birth of the Interstate Highway System
In 1919, Army Captain Dwight David Eisenhower traveled
across the country as part of a military convoy.

The

purpose of Eisenhower's journey was not to deploy troops or
engage in any other activity typically associated with the
armed forces.

Instead, the objective of the mission was to

point out the need for better roads across the United
States.

The army believed that modernizing the nation's

road system would improve its ability to mobilize within the
country's borders.

The expedition encountered countless

obstacles and revealed that the nation's roads were in need
of major improvements.1
Eisenhower's experience in Europe during World War II
also influenced his thinking on transportation.

He "had

seen the superlative system of the German Autobahnen—
national highways crossing that country and offering the
possibility, often lacking in the United States, to drive

!Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell to
Friends (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company,
1967), 153-54, 157; John Wickman, "Ike and The Great Truck
Train," Kansas History 13 (Autumn, 1990): 139-148.
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with speed and safety at the same time."2

Eisenhower often

talked about the nation's highway system after his ascension
to the presidency.

He saw American roads as much improved

since the 1919 convoy trip, but still inadequate to provide
for the country's transportation needs.3

Eisenhower made

improving the nation's roads an objective of his first
administration.

In doing so, Eisenhower identified

automobiles and trucks as the mode of transportation
Americans would use most in the coming decades.

This belief

led to a construction plan that viewed highways as a
solution to urban traffic problems as well as a method of
evacuating cities in case of nuclear attack.

Marty railroad

and mass transit advocates raised objections to these
sections of the administration's plan, but these interests
found that Congress and the president did not listen to
their concerns as attentively as they had during the
Progressive Era.
The country's road system evolved from Indian paths
and from trails that the first colonists carved as they
began to move inland.

Gradually, a road connected all the

2Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate
for Change, 1953-1956 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and
Company, 1963), 548.
3A good example of Eisenhower's position on the
highways can be found in "Special Message to Congress
Regarding a Nation Highway Program," February 22, 1955,
Public Papers of the President of the United States: Dwight
D. Eisenhower, 1955 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1959), 275-76.
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colonies on which "post riders carried mail once a month (in
summer) along the six-hundred-mile route between Boston and
Williamsburg."4

The stagecoaches' popularity during the

latter half of the eighteenth century brought more roads
into existence.

Railroads, however, led to highway neglect

because the rails provided the best means of moving both
passengers and freight over long distances.5
The Duryea brothers' construction of the first gasoline
operated motorcar in 1893 began shifting America's attention
away from the locomotive and onto the automobile.

There

were 8,000 cars in the U. S. by 1900 and 458,500 by 1910.
By 1925, Americans owned 20 million automobiles.6

In 1916,

the federal government became increasingly involved in
constructing roads.

Federal aid to highways came with the

condition that each state create a highway department
responsible for choosing road locations.

This initial aid

program also established that the individual states and the
federal government would split the cost of highway projects.
The Department of Commerce established the Office of Public

Quotation from Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Public Roads, Highways in the United States (Washington:
GPO, 1954), 1. This publication provides an overview of
highway development in the United States.
5Helen Leavitt, Superhighway-Superhoax (Garden City ,
New York: Doubleday and Company, 1970), 22.
6Bureau of Public Roads, Highways in the United States,
2; Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, Highway
Statistics: Summary to 1955 (Washington: GPO, 1957), 18-19.
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Roads (later to become the Bureau of Public Roads) to
oversee federal funding of highway construction.

Many

states imposed a tax on gasoline and the revenue from this
tax was put aside specifically for highway construction.7
During the 19 30s, the federal government struggled to
build enough roads to keep up with the ever growing number
of vehicles traveling America's highways.

Two New Deal

programs, the Civil Works Administration and the Works
Progress Administration, constructed and repaired 500,000
miles of roadway.

The Bureau of Public Roads also spent

depression relief money while working with state highway
departments to study expanding road demand.8
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor ended these
efforts.

During World War II, the United States used

highways extensively to ship goods and raw materials to and
from factories and to transport workers to and from their
jobs.

This crucial role in the war effort had a

debilitating effect on the nation's highways.

During the

war years, Congress allocated no money for highway

7Leavitt, Superhighway-Superhoax, 22-23; Mark Rose,
Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1939-1989 (Knoxville,
Tennessee: University of Tennessee Press, 1990), 4, 8-9.
8William Leuchtenburg, Franklin Roosevelt and the New
Deal, 1932-1940 (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 121; John
B. Rae, The Road and the Car in American Life (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Press), 74.
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construction and upkeep.9

At war's end, the country faced

further problems as millions of GIs returned and began
settling not in the cities, but in the suburbs.

This

migration greatly expanded the roadside economy that began
developing during the 1920s to serve highway travelers.
Fueling stations multiplied and motels and hotels achieved
respectability as the American family took to the road on
vacation.

McDonald's sprang up to feed hungry travelers,

and a new institution— the shopping mall— featured acres and
acres of parking to draw customers out of the increasingly
dangerous and congested cities.10
Toward the war's end, the Roosevelt administration
attempted to deal with highway deterioration.

The Federal-

Aid Highway Act of 1944 appropriated $1.5 billion for road
rehabilitation, but this amount simply was not enough to
solve the enormous difficulties that existed.11
But the 1944 legislation did have a lasting impact on

9Bureau of Public Roads, Highways in the United States,
3-4; Congress, House, Message from the President of the
United States, Highway Needs for National Defense
(Washington: GPO, 1949), 85-87.
10Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The
Suburbanization of America (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1985) is the best source on the post-war suburban
boom. Also see Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for
Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991),
550-554.
uRose, Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1939-1989,
25-27; Bruce E. Seely, Building the American Highway System:
Engineers as Policymakers (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1987), 187-191.
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how the federal government would manage highway affairs.
Thomas H. MacDonald, the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Public Roads, established the National System of Interstate
Highways within the Federal-Aid Act of 1944.

The interstate

system's routes were a subdivision of the primary highway
system and "connected all the major cities and production
centers . . . and are the most heavily traveled in the
country."12

Separating certain roads into a distinct group

of interstate highways laid the groundwork for future road
construction legislation that would focus on this interstate
system.

MacDonald also succeeded in setting aside a small

amount of money ($125 million) for highways within urban
areas.

This action set a precedent that would also become

important in the future.13
By 1954, forty-eight million cars, and ten million
trucks traveled American roads.14

But the highway system

still could not meet those vehicles' demands and all those
concerned agreed that the nation's highway network needed

12Bureau of Public Roads, Highways in the United States,
5.
13John B. Rae, The American Automobile: A Brief History
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 186-87;
Richard O. Davies, The Age of Asphalt: The Automobile, the
Freeway, and the Condition of Metropolitan America
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Company, 1975), 13.
14Congress, House, The President's Advisory Committee on
a National Highway Program. A National Highway Program: A
Report to the President. 84th Congress, 1st Session, 1955,
3.
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improvement.

Solving this problem became the mission of

what has been described as the "most unique and massive
coalition of single-minded pressure ever to hit the American
scene."15

The "highway lobby," a diverse group comprised of

interests including car manufacturers, oil companies,
automobile and trucking associations, and state and federal
road officials, agreed on one crucial point: the current
highway system was obsolete and in desperate need of
modernization.16 R. H. Baldock, a member of the American
Association of State Highway Officials, echoed this
dissatisfaction when testifying before Congress in 1953. He
stated: "The highways, as they currently exist, are
obsolete, worn out, and cannot fulfill traffic demands. It
is my opinion that this is taking a terrible toll on our
entire economy and I think it is one of the most important
issues before the people of this country."17
In the early 1950s, the highway lobby formed Project
Adequate Roads (PAR).

The PAR highlighted the need for

further highway construction and tried to reconcile the
divergent opinions within the lobby on how road development

15Quotation from Paul Ylvisaker, "The Deserted City,"
Journal of American Institute of Planners 25 (February,
1959): 5.
16Davies, The Age of Asphalt, describes the highway
lobby as containing these interests, 20.
17Congress, House, Committee on Public Works, National
Highway Study: Hearings before the Committee on Public
Works, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, 1953, 231.
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and improvement should proceed.

Some promoted a national

toll road system, arguing that those who used the highways
should help pay for them.

Toll roads would also serve as a

mechanism to test highway needs.

If traffic on the toll

roads did not create sufficient income, then further highway
construction was not needed.

At the other extreme, the

Bureau of Public Roads advocated an ambitious, toll-free
system financed entirely by the federal government.

This

wide range of opinions prevented the PAR from developing a
plan for future highway construction.18
As the PAR struggled to formulate a road policy, state
and federal highway officials studied methods of meeting the
nation's transportation demands.

State and federal studies

consistently concluded that more highways were the solution.
These state and federal officials, however, had a personal
interest in seeing highway construction increased.19

For

this reason, it is not accurate to assume that highway

18Congress, House, Committee on Public Works, The
Federal Highway Act of 1954: Hearings before the Committee
on Public Works, 84th Congress, 1st Session, 1954, 30; Rose,
Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1939-1989, 70.
19Examples of state road studies which advocated further
highway construction can be found in Congress, House,
Committee on Public Works, H . R . 42 60: To Create a Federal
Highway Corporation for Financing the Construction of the
National System of Interstate Highways: Hearings before the
Committee on Public Works, 84th Congress, 1st session, 1955,
54-67, 433 and Congress, House, Committee on Public Works,
Letter from the Secretary of Commerce: Needs of the Highway
Systems, 1955-84, report prepared by the Commissioner of
Public Roads in cooperation with the several state highway
departments, 84th Congress, 1st session, 1954, 1-2 2.
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construction was the inevitable result of the automobile's
popularity.

The Bureau of Public Roads, along with the

various state highway departments, asserted a high degree of
influence over highway policy.
of goals it wished to attain.

The Bureau established a set
This "wish list" included

building free, not toll roads, emphasized the primacy of
urban highways, and maintained that the BPR should have some
influence over choosing interstate system routes.

Despite

the partisan nature of its position on these and many other
highway-related issues, the BPR maintained a reputation for
apolitical expertise in the eyes of Congress and others
interested in highway policy.

Thus, the BPR influenced

almost every major feature of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of
1956 without Congress or the Eisenhower administration
perceiving the Bureau as a special interest group attempting
to promote highway legislation.20
Thomas MacDonald, who had been instrumental in creating
the National System of Interstate Highways as Commissioner
of Public Roads in the 1940s, also continued to influence
highway policy.

He supported constructing new highways

because traffic, particularly in the cities, had increased
faster than expected after World War II.

In 1946, MacDonald

wrote that the most important question facing American

20Seely, Building the American Highway System: Engineers
as Policy Makers, is the best source on the BPR's influence
over highway policy during the twentieth century.
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cities was if "we should build highways which will enable
traffic to move into and through the city quickly and
safely, or should we try to get along with things the way
they are?"

MacDonald believed that "cities which refused to

modernize their highways will pay a heavy price in loss of
business and depreciation of property values in central
business districts."21
Earlier highway projects had emphasized improving the
movement of people and cargo between cities.

MacDonald,

however, viewed highways as a cure for urban transportation
problems.

He excluded all other means of transportation,

such as commuter rails and rapid transit systems, that might
have helped solve these difficulties. The Bureau of Public
Roads incorporated this change in emphasis into its official
position on how highway construction should proceed.

In a

1954 policy statement, the bureau recommended the
"development of the interstate highway system and the
secondary road system into urban areas."22
In 1954, the Eisenhower administration formulated a
plan to meet highway demands. On July 12, Vice-President
Richard Nixon made a speech before the nation's governors

21Quotations from Thomas H. MacDonald, "The Case for
Urban Expressways," American City 61 (November, 1946): 116.
22Leavitt, Superhighway-Superhoax, 7-8; Quotation from
Congress, House, Federal Highway Act of 1954: Hearings
Before the Committee on Public Works, 83rd Congress, 1st
Session, 1954, 15.
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supporting McDonald's position on developing an urban
highway system. The Vice-President said:
The nation's highway network is obsolete and
inadequate. Although it has been adjusted to meet
metropolitan traffic gluts, transcontinental movement,
and increased horsepower, it has never been completely
overhauled or planned to satisfy the needs of the 10
years ahead. Therefore, [this administration] is
calling for a grand plan for a properly articulated
[highway program] that solves the problems of speedy,
safe continental travel, intercity transportation . . .
and metropolitan area congestion.23
Vice-President Nixon's statement echoed MacDonald's
position by calling not only for an intercity highway
system, but also for a system that would relieve inner city
congestion.

By asserting that the highway system could

solve intracity transportation problems, Nixon also
supported using highways as a cure for urban

transportation

problems while neglecting mass transit alternatives.

This

myopic view of transportation problems and solutions did not
deter support for Nixon's plan. In fact, the speech "had an
electrifying effect on the governors, state highway
officials, and groups interested in highways."24
The Eisenhower administration then ventured to develop

23Congress, House, The President's Advisory Committee on
a National Highway Program, A National Highway Program: A
Report to the President. 84th Congress, 1st Session, 1955,
1.

24Quotation from "Memorandum from highway consultant
Robert Newcomb to the Council of Economic Advisors," August
23, 1954, in The Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1961: A
Documentary History, Robert L. Branyan and Lawrence H.
Larsen, editors (New York: Random House, 1971), 539.
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a plan that would satisfy the various groups interested in
highway construction.

This rather ambitious task fell to

retired General Lucius D. Clay, whom Eisenhower appointed to
head a Special Advisory Committee.

General Clay, a member

of the board of directors at General Motors, selected
supporters of highway construction to serve on this
committee.

The committee Clay convened consisted of Sloan

Colt, the President of Bankers Trust,

Steven Bechtel, who

operated one of the largest construction companies in
America at the time, William Roberts, who headed AllisChalmers, a company that built construction equipment, and
David Beck of the Teamsters Union.25
From the outset, the committee agreed that "The
existing [highway] system is inadequate for both current and
future needs and must be improved to meet the urgent
requirements of . . .

an expanding economy."26

The

committee heard from the American Automobile Association,
who "regarded the interstate highway system to be of utmost
importance and therefore, recommends aggressive federal

25In Jean Edward Smith's Lucius D . Clay: An American
Life (New York: Henry Holt and Company), 618-19, Clay admits
that these individuals made for a "loaded committee," but
"if we were going to build highways, I [Clay] wanted people
who knew something about highways."
26Quotation from Congress, House, A 10-Year Highway
Program: A Report to the President, xiii.
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action to improve this system."27

The Highway Municipal

Association believed the "Federal government should
concentrate its efforts on the interstate system. Cities are
the most critical area and Federal highway legislation
should recognize this fact."28

The National Association of

Motor Bus Operators asserted that "Federal aid should be
heavily concentrated upon the interstate system: $2 billion
per year for ten years for this purpose merits serious
consideration.1,29

Finally, controversial New York City

planner Robert Moses recommended "at least $50 billion in
the next 10 years for highways, including $15 billion in
metropolitan areas."30 Moses went on to argue that the
urban system was of the greatest importance, but also faced
the greatest resistance from forces within the cities.
Local opposition, Moses stated, could be "overcome by
establishing engineering and other standards which can only
be departed from at risk of loss of federal and state aid of
all kinds."31

In other words, Moses contended that cities

should be required to build more highways and if they

27Quotation from Congress, House, The President's
Advisory Committee on a National Highway Program, Hearings
on a National Highway Program, 8 3rd Congress, 2nd Session,
1954, 215.
28Ibid. , 246-47.
29Ibid. , 340.
30Ibid. , 347.
31Ibid. , 348.
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refused, then all government aid to them would be cut off.
Everyone concerned agreed that the problem stemmed from
the road system's inability to accommodate expanding traffic
volumes.

If the roads could not meet the country's demands,

the Clay committee could have addressed this problem on a
more expansive level that would examine not only highways,
but the entire transportation system.

A broader context

might have caused the committee to realize that it faced two
different problems: How to improve intercity travel and how
to alleviate urban traffic congestion.

By the early 1950s,

highway routes between cities had become obsolete.

The

automobile, however, was not the only means of
transportation used for intracity travel.

Robert Moses

highlighted urban congestion in his testimony before the
Advisory Committee when he argued that "the needs of the
cities must not be minimized because they require relatively
little mileage.

This is strategic mileage of vital

importance to both the interstate and urban systems."32

But

drawing people away from the highways, and therefore,
substantially cutting the number of vehicles traveling on
urban expressways also could have solved urban congestion.
Accomplishing this task would have required more funding for
other means of transportation such as commuter railways and
rapid transit systems.

32Ibid. , 347.

The Clay Committee, however, did not
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hear from mass transportation representatives.

The Advisory

committee ignored alternatives to highways and did not weigh
the consequences of an automobile-dominated transportation
system.

Furthermore, the committee failed to consider what

effect the highways might have on other transit systems or
the highways' impact on the urban environment.33
Others forwarded ideas that the committee could have
consulted.

City planner Harland Bartholomew urged a

balanced approach to improving urban transportation.

In a

1954 article, Bartholomew stated:
It is in our best interest to thoroughly develop
sound mass transportation. This approach does not mean
halting individual automobile traffic. It does mean
restricting it where necessary for better
accommodations for the majority of the traveling
public. It does mean giving mass transportation first
consideration as the basic and
predominant means
of transportation. It does mean restricting the
automobile to its rightful place as a supplemental
vehicle to be accommodated only after major
transportation needs have been provided for.34
Bartholomew, however, did not testify before the Clay
committee, nor did any other advocates of solutions that did

^Representatives of interests that testified before the
President's Advisory Committee included the American
Trucking Association, the Automobile Manufacturers'
Association, the United States Chamber of Commerce, the
American Automobile Association, the Associated General
Contractors, the Automotive Safety Foundation, and the
National Highway Users Conference.
This list, although
incomplete, is a fair sample of the highway interests that
presented their arguments before the Advisory Committee.
Congress, House, Hearings on a National Highway Program,
viii.
34Harland Bartholomew, "Planning for Metro Transport,"
Planning and Civic Comment 105 (September, 1954): 4.
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not endorse further highway construction.
The American Transit Association (ATA), a national
organization that represented urban transit interests, sent
a letter to the committee after its hearings were completed.
In this letter, the association "noted that an opportunity
had recently been accorded the American Trucking
Association, the National Association of Motor Bus
Operators, the American Automobile Association, and other
highway users to submit statements on national highway
matters."

Not having been invited to submit a statement,

the ATA pointed out that "sight is lost of the fact that as
new expressways and freeways feed more and more automobiles
into already crowded urban districts, the problem of traffic
congestion becomes more acute."

The influx of additional

cars would overburden city street systems and "create a
demand for constantly enlarged off-street parking
facilities, the combined effect being an ever-increasing
drain upon our national economy for the provision of
facilities for the primary use of the private motorist."
The ATA also maintained that "there will have to be
continuing dependence upon public transit facilities if the
central business districts of our cities are to survive and
prosper. "35

35Quotations from George W. Anderson, executive VicePresident of the American Transit Association, to the
President's Advisory Committee on a National Highway
Program, October 25, 1954. Quoted in Davies, The Age of
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The transit association's letter demonstrated that they
understood where future problems would develop if the
government built more highways.

They saw traffic gridlock

and inadequate parking facilities as formidable obstacles in
attracting people to urban business areas.

The Advisory

Committee, however, turned a deaf ear on the ATA's plea to
consider mass transit alternatives.

In the committee's

final report to President Eisenhower, Clay and his
associates stated that their "Committee was created to
consider the highway network, and other media of
transportation do not fall within its province."36
The Advisory Committee devised a ten-year, $27 billion
interstate highway construction program.

The Clay committee

asserted that the interstates were the most important part
of the road system because they carried "more than oneseventh of all traffic, one-fifth of the rural traffic,
serve 65 percent of the urban population, and 45 percent of
the rural population, and is the key network from the
standpoint of Federal interest in productivity and national

Asphalt, 60-63.
36Congress, House, A 10-Year Highway Program: A Report
to the President, 3. Also see Congress, Senate, Subcommittee
on Surface Transportation, "Correspondence, vol. 1," File
84, Box 4, Record Group 46, National Archives, Washington,
D. C. for additional criticism of the Eisenhower
administration's use of highways to solve urban
transportation problems.
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defense."37

The committee endorsed raising funds for this

project through a newly established Federal Highway
Corporation that would issue $25 billion in bonds.

Funds

collected from the federal tax on gasoline and lubricating
oils would retire these bonds over a thirty-year period.
The federal corporation would redirect this tax money from
the general fund into a separate Highway Trust Fund account.
The Clay committee believed that revenue from the gasoline
and lubricating oil tax would increase dramatically as
traffic increased, thus allowing the federal government to
pay for 9 0 percent of the proposed interstate highway
program.38
Although Clay maintained that "the entire economy of
the United States is built on transportation . . .

in all

fields; rail, air, water, and highway," he also believed
that the "automobile occupies a very unique place in the
transportation system of the United States, not only for the
movement of goods and persons, but it has indeed become a
part of our social structure.1,39

Despite the Advisory

37Congress, House, A 10-Year Highway Program: A Report
to the President, 5.
38Congress, House, Committee on Public Works, H.R. 4260:
To Create a Federal Highway Corporation for Financing the
Construction of the National System of Interstate Highways:
Hearings Before the Committee on Public Works, 84th
Congress, 1st Session, 129-30.
39Lucius D. Clay, "A New National Highway Program,"
Virginia Municipal Review 32 (January, 1955), 8.
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Committee's failure to examine the transportation system as
a whole, Clay viewed his committee's proposal as a "bold
measure" that would solve traffic congestion problems well
into the future and would "contribute to the well-being of
America. "40
President Eisenhower endorsed the findings of his
Advisory Committee's findings and on February 22, 1955, he
delivered a special message to Congress on the proposed
program.

Eisenhower identified four reasons for building

more highways.
unsafe.

First, he asserted that the road system was

During the early 1950s, traffic accidents killed

over thirty-six thousand people and injured over one million
more.

Eisenhower believed that further highway construction

and improvement would help save lives.41

Second, the

president cited the immediate economic benefits of
constructing the interstate highway system.

He said "the

physical condition of the present roads increases the cost
of vehicle operation by as much as one cent per mile of
vehicle travel.

At the present rate of travel, this totals

more than $5 billion a year."42

The president looked upon

improving the highways as a positive step toward reducing

40Ibid. , 9.
41U. S. President, Public Papers of the President of the
United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1959),
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955, 276.
42Ibid. , 276.
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this extra cost that "was passed on through each step in the
distribution of goods" and "paid ultimately by the
individual consumer."43
Third, the government estimated that by 1965, eightyone million vehicles would be traveling American roads.

The

United States needed highway improvement and development or
"existing traffic jams will only faintly foreshadow those of
ten years hence."44

Fourth, Eisenhower invoked Cold War

fears to establish merit for highway construction: "In case
of atomic attack on our cities, the roads must permit quick
evacuation of target areas, mobilization of defense forces
and maintenance of every essential economic function. But
the present system in critical areas would be the breeder of
a deadly congestion within hours of attack."45
Once again, the Eisenhower administration saw highway
Construction as a way of solving urban problems.

Clay's

Advisory Committee had endorsed highway construction as a
means to move people around and through cities.

Here, the

president advocated using highways to evacuate cities in the
event of nuclear attack.

But this purpose, like the Clay

committee's rationale for building more highways, also
contained some serious defects.

43Ibid. , 276.
^Ibid., 276.
45Ibid. , 276.

53
General Clay had been the director of New York State's
civil defense program during the early 1950s.

While

planning the evacuation of New York City in case of nuclear
attack, Clay realized "it would take more than an hour to
empty some of New York's larger skyscrapers."46

Such a

lengthy evacuation time would minimize the highways'
effectiveness because the Strategic Air Command did not
expect significant advanced warning of an attack.

Still,

many highway supporters latched onto the idea that more
highways would help evacuate cities during a crisis.

The

Clay committee report stressed that "the capacity of the
interstate highways to transport urban populations in an
emergency is of utmost importance.

Large-scale evacuation

would be needed in the event of an A-Bomb or H-Bomb
attack."47

The report also relied on testimony from the

Federal Civil Defense Administrator, who asserted that "the
withdrawal task is the biggest problem ever faced in the
world.1148
When congressional debate began on the president's
highway program, many highway lobbyists cited national and
civil defense as reason to build more highways.

George T.

McCoy, President of the American Association of State

46Smith, Lucius D. Clay: An American Life, 57 6.
47Congress, House, A 10-Year Highway Program: A Report
to the President, 5.
48Ibid. , 5.

54
Highway Officials, stated that the interstate system should
be expanded "because of the unsettled nature of
international affairs.

With new instruments of war, we

might not in the future be spared the horrors of being in an
active military theater."49 Managing Director of the
American Trucking Association John V. Lawrence asserted "If
the Interstate System is as important to the military and
civilian defense of the Nation [sic] as indicated, the 10year [highway] program . . . seems vital.

Current newspaper

headlines would indicate that if we had the system today it
would be none too soon."50 Automobile Manufacturers
Association President James J. Nance said that:
our roads and streets are not now capable of
meeting demands they may face in the event of another
war— which may call for mass evacuation of large cities
and extreme reliance on a form of transportation that,
because of its flexibility and its sheer number of
units, is less vulnerable to paralysis under largescale bombing attacks against the continent.51
In his testimony before Congress, General Clay stated
that the "total bearing of the cost [for the highways] by
the federal government was justified because these roads
have been certified as

necessary to national defense . . .

and urgent to the civil defense program for the evacuation

49Congress, Senate, Committee on Public Works, Bills
Related to the National Highway Program: Hearings Before
Subcommittee on Roads of the Committee on Public Works, 84th
Congress, 1st Session, 1955, 156.
50Ibid. , 531.
51Ibid. , 487.
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of our cities."52

Several members of Congress raised

objections to this motive.

Senator Patrick McNamara of

Michigan doubted the public's ability to effectively use the
highways as an escape route.

He declared that the "most

modern and best designed highways in the country would not
last ten minutes as a means of escape when people are
running for their lives."53

Senator Albert Gore of

Tennessee also had "grave doubts about the feasibility of
evacuating, for instance, New York City."54

General Clay

answered these doubts by drawing on his experience as New
York State's civil defense director.

He did yield to the

argument that the highways were not a cure all for
evacuation needs, but he did not acknowledge the doubts he
had expressed himself when he looked at New York City.55
During the 1950s, advancing civil defense rationales
for building the interstate highway system was an effective
method of winning support for the program.

The Cold War

bred fear of atomic warfare in American society and
Eisenhower and other highway supporters manipulated these
fears to gain approval for the highway program.

Eisenhower

spelled out the interstate program's economic and safety

52Ibid. , 395.
53Ibid. , 405.
54Ibid. , 406.
55Ibid. , 408-414.
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benefits and then added grimly worded rhetoric describing
"our obsolescent highways, too small for the flood of
traffic of an entire city's people going one way," turning
"into traps of death and destruction"56 to drive home the
need for the interstate highway system.

Furthermore,

General Clay's recollection of Eisenhower's original
reasoning for more highways did not contain a civil or
national defense pretense.

He remembered the president and

Sherman Adams, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, being "concerned
for the economy.

We were facing a possible recession, and

he [Eisenhower] wanted to have something on the books that
would enable us to move quickly if we had to go into public
works.1,57
Civil defense rationales for the interstate system were
dubious at best, but military leaders also made an effective
argument that the proposed interstate highway system was
important to national defense and military mobilization.
The military had supported road construction and improvement
for defense purposes since the days of Eisenhower's convoy
trip across the nation.

During World War II, the highways

had proved their worth in transporting workers and goods to
and from factories.

In 1955, Major General Paul F. Yount,

Chief of Transportation for the United States Army, stated

56Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956, 501.
57Smith, Lucius D . Clay: An American Life, 618.
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that "Today's crucial defense needs lie in improving to
modern standards the forty-thousand-mile Interstate Highway
System.

This vital network must be able to handle the

volume and weight of military and industrial traffic that
will flood our highways in the event of a national
emergency.,|58
Providing for military use of the highways, however,
was not taken into consideration when construction began on
the new highway system.

In her book, Superhighway-

Superhoax, Helen Leavitt points out that road builders set
the clearance for bridges at fourteen feet.

"As early as

1954, the size of the Atlas missile, which exceeded the 14foot minimum, was well established and the difficulties of
transporting the weapon from California to Cape Kennedy were
known in 1956 when the interstate system was launched."59
Not until 1960 was a standard established to accommodate a
vertical clearance of sixteen feet. "During those four years
more than 2 000 bridges or structures were built to the
obsolete standard."60

Leavitt concluded that this glaring

discrepancy resulted from a lack of genuine concern "for the
defense role the highway system would play, since labeling
the system vital to our national defense was simply a

58Jay Dugan, "Highways in National Defense," Freedom of
the American Road (Detroit: The Ford Motor Company), 18.
59Leavitt, Superhighways-Superhoax, 187-88.
60Ibid. , 188.
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'sweetening' device to gain support for the program in
1956.61

61Ibid. , 188.

CHAPTER III
Eight Hoover Dams and Six Sidewalks to the Moon:
The Battle for the Interstate Highway System
After General Clay's Special Advisory Committee made
its recommendations for an expanded highway program,
Congress spent more than a year and a-half debating the
plan's merits and drawbacks.

The final bill, passed by both

houses of Congress and signed by President Eisenhower on
July 29, 1956, represented total victory for those who
championed a federally-funded highway system that solved
both interstate and intracity transportation problems.
Railroad representatives vigorously resisted a federally
subsidized interstate highway system, but their industry's
economic vitality and influence over transportation policy
had dwindled significantly since the era of cooperation
between the railroads and the Interstate Commerce
Commission.
As congressional debate on the interstate highway
system began, the railroad industry was mulling over a
proposal to petition the Interstate Commerce Commission for
a 15 percent rate hike.

Because of the industry's weak

position, railroad leaders wanted to ascertain the impact of
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a new interstate highway system on their industry.1 But
railroad interests could not immediately appraise the
situation because a temporary but radical shift in the two
major parties' fiscal philosophies occurred during opening
debates on the highway proposal.
The administration-backed Clay program would create a
Federal Highway Corporation to oversee highway funding.

The

corporation's executive board would issue $25 billion in
bonds and would pay off these bonds over the following
thirty years.2

This financing scheme threw congressional

Democrats into a state of shock.

For twenty years they had

been criticized for attempting to increase government
spending and implement what some Republicans believed was a
socialist agenda.

The New Deal's most strident opponents

had argued that Franklin Roosevelt's policies would swell
the national debt, which, in turn, would bankrupt future
generations.

Three years after finally defeating those who

sought to pursue such irresponsible fiscal policy, the new
Republican administration introduced a bill to spend an
enormous amount of tax revenue on a public works project
much like those proposed under the New Deal.

Despite

Eisenhower and Clay's vigorous efforts to lobby Congress,
1New York Times, September 19, 1955.
2The Clay proposal's financing plan can be found in
Congress, House, The President's Advisory Committee on a
National Highway Program. A National Highway Program: A
Report to the President. 84th Congress, 1st Session, 1955,
20- 2 1 .
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the Senate's Democratic majority made sure that the Clay
committee's proposal never reached the Senate floor.3
But the Clay proposal's defeat did not mean that the
new interstate system was dead.

Virtually all highway

legislation brought before Congress during the twentieth
century faced one similar obstacle: "Everyone loves roads,
but no one wants to pay for them."4

Senator Albert Gore of

Tennessee drew up an alternate bill that dealt with
financial concerns by completely ignoring them.

Gore left

finding the money for new highways to the House of
Representatives, where all bills requiring tax money were
supposed to originate.
not stop there.

But Senator Gore's alterations did

He adamantly disagreed with the emphasis

that Clay and the Eisenhower administration had placed on
the interstate highway system.

Gore's bill reflected his

dissent by reducing the highway program's length from ten to
five years and by cutting the amount spent on the interstate
system from $25 billion to $5.5 billion, while decreasing
the secondary and rural road allocation by just $1.5

3Theodore H. White, "Where Are Those New Roads?"
Collier's 137 (January 6, 1956), 48; Mark H. Rose,
Interstate: Expressway Highway Politics, 1939-1989
(Knoxville, Tennessee: The University of Tennessee Press,
1990), 76.
4White, "Where Are Those New Roads?" 47.
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billion.5

The proposal conflicted with the highway lobby's

interests because their endorsement of the Clay proposal was
firmly attached to the interstate system and the emphasis
placed on building more highways to solve urban
transportation and congestion problems.

Although the Senate

passed the Gore bill, it encountered trouble in the House of
Representatives, where the highway lobby exercised its
influence most effectively.

Additional hearings dragged on

through the spring and early summer of 1955.6
Meanwhile, Representative George Fallon, a Maryland
Democrat who had supported road legislation throughout his
tenure in Congress, submitted an alternate bill.

Fallon's

proposal garnered much attention— and caused a great deal of
confusion— because this bill also reacted against the Clay
plan's financing strategy.

Several highway lobby members

found Fallon's plan disconcerting.

Although his resolution

would build the interstate highway system this lobby so
desperately sought, the Fallon plan would also saddle them
with $375 million per year in additional taxes.

Therefore,

the trucking associations, tire and independent oil dealers,
and diesel manufacturers ultimately decided to mobilize
against Fallon's initiative.

Democratic supporters of

5Senator Gore's proposal is published in Congress,
Senate, Committee on Public Works, Federal Highway Act of
1955, 84th Congress, 1st Session, 987-998.
^hite,

"Where Are Those New Roads," 49.
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Fallon's bill called for fiscal responsibility, further
illustrating the flip-flop in economic philosophy between
the two parties.

They argued that taxing truckers and tire

and petroleum manufacturers placed part of the new highway
system's financial burden on those who would benefit most
from its construction.7

Many Democrats in Congress also

asserted that Clay's proposal to set up a bond corporation
was an effort to evade the government's legal debt limit.
Democrats argued that "the huge $280 billion official
national debt was about to spin off a satellite 'Corporate'
debt into Space, perhaps followed by others, until we had a
whole constellation of satellite debts whirling about the
economy, all exerting an irresistible inflationary pull."8
According to Theodore White, Republicans answered these
criticisms "as if the mantle of Franklin D. Roosevelt and
all the ghosts of the New Deal had descended on them:
Nothing great of creative is ever done unless one reasonably
finances the present out of the future," they maintained.
The Eisenhower administration believed that if Congress
followed Clay's recommendations and the federal government

7"Correspondence," Box 452, File 883 6-1, Record Group
23 3, Considerations for a National Highway Program: A
Summary of Problems , Programs and Points of View, details
the additional taxes contained in the Fallon bill. Fallon's
bill was submitted to the House as H.R. 7 072, Congress,
House, Committee on Public Works, Hearings, National Highway
Program, Part 2, 84th Congress, 1st Session, 19 55, 10971100.

Quotation from White, "Where Are Those New Roads?" 48.
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built the new highways immediately with borrowed funds,
highway use would rapidly increase and the additional
gasoline taxes generated would more than cover construction
expenses.9
This peculiar exchange of fiscal ideology between the
two parties puzzled railroad leaders as they attempted to
decide whether they would favor or oppose the Fallon bill.
Legislation following Clay's financing methods would provide
the trucking industry with a brand-new, federally-financed
interstate highway system.

Such vast improvement to the

country's road network would mean truckers could enhance the
quality and speed of their service without spending a dime.
These improvements would also help strip the rails of their
long-haul freight business.

The railways had already seen

the airlines take away their long-haul passengers and
automobiles decimate their short-trip commuter business.
Essentially, then, railroad leaders viewed any highway bill
that followed the Clay financing plan as the final nail in
their coffin.10
As the railroad industry formulated a strategy toward
highway legislation, blatant resistance to highway expansion
appeared unfeasible.

Railroad executives knew that the

general public favored expanding and improving the nation's

9Ibid., 48.
10Ibid. , 50.
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road network.

The railroads concluded that they had to

sanction highway construction.

Otherwise, the highway lobby

would portray the railroads as an obstacle to national
progress and security and, in the process, become a
scapegoat for the highway program's failure.

This decided,

railroad leaders sought to display public support for
highway expansion without jeopardizing their industry's
existence.
strategy.

The Fallon bill fit perfectly into their
Fallon's proposal balanced trucking industry

gains made through highway expansion and improvement with
losses incurred through addition taxation.

These losses

would drive trucking rates skyward and create a more level
playing field for competition between the trucking and
railroad industries.

Or so railroad leaders hoped.

American Railroad Association Vice-President Robert S.
Henry explained the railroads' position in this way:
Highways? Why of course we're in favor of good
highways. But we want a sound highway program and any
sound highway program has to include user charges—
people who benefit from it should pay, and that's
particularly true of people who use these facilities to
carry on commercial business. We railways pay in taxes
11.9 cents of every dollar we take in; we pay 19.7
cents more of every dollar to maintain our roadbeds and
tracks. The truckers pay only 7 cents of their dollar
for taxes and they get their roadbeds free. . . .
That's just not fair— and that's why we think the
Fallon bill is such a good bill.11
Many within the trucking industry did not agree with
Henry's position.

nIbid., 50.

John Lawrence, the American Trucking
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Association's managing director, compared railroad advocates
to locusts when he asserted that "No such railroad lobby has
descended on Washington in the history of the Republic as
that which is now operating in support of the soak-thetrucks proposals.

It is this wrecking crew which is mainly

responsible for throwing the highway situation out of
perspective.1,12
This was not the first time that truckers and railroad
owners had disagreed.

Antagonism between the two industries

increased as truckers took a larger and larger share of
railroad business.

In 192 6, railroads carried almost 77

percent of intercity ton-miles.

By 1956, the rails' share

had fallen to 49 percent while their share of gross revenues
fell from 87 to 34 percent.

On the other hand, trucks

carried fourteen times their 1926 ton-miles, nearly onefifth of all ton-miles produced in 1956.13
Twenty-five years after cementing its relationship with
the federal government, the railroad industry found itself
trying to convince Congress that another industry would
unfairly benefit from federal assistance.

Many railroad

advocates claimed that trucks did not face the same degree

12Ibid. , 52.
13Congress, Senate, "Manuscript of Report of the
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce" Box 13 File 85A-F10, Record
Group 46, Problems of the Railroads, National Archives,
Washington, D. C . ; Hilton, The Transportation Act of 1958,
10 - 1 1 .
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of government regulation as the railroads and, as a result,
could charge lower rates.

The Interstate Commerce

Commission had extended its regulating powers to the
trucking industry in 1933, but the regulation enacted was
generally lenient.

Contract and common carriers— those

contracted to carry individual shippers' freight and those
who hauled general freight, such as moving vans and
automobile carriers— were subject to the ICC's authority.
The ICC required contract carriers to obtain an operating
permit and report a schedule of minimum charges but did not
demand a list of specific fees.

The ICC set common

carriers' fees and routes and, therefore, these carriers
faced more stringent regulation.

Private carriers— those

who owned trucks for transporting their own products— were
exempt from all ICC control except safety regulations.

In

1952, there were twice as many exempt carriers as contract
and common carriers combined.14
Railroad leaders hoped to emphasize this relative lack
of regulation when promoting Representative Fallon's bill.
But the trucking industry, along with diesel manufacturers,
and the big oil and tire companies launched a massive
lobbying effort aimed at defeating the bill.

These

interests argued that singling out their industries for

14|lWhere Do Trucks Go from Here?" Business Week,,
November 22, 1952, 72-73; Hilton, The Transportation Act of
1958, 7-9.
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additional taxation was unfair and painted a dark picture of
a tax-crippled diesel industry unable to provide sufficient
fuel for the diesel-powered military.

An avalanche of

telegrams hit Congress during the early summer of 1955.
Small businesspeople described the harm additional taxes
would have on their economic well-being.

David Beck,

president of the Teamster's Union and member of the Clay
Advisory Committee, mobilized his union to defeat the Fallon
bill.

House members received telegrams from truckers who

stopped on their routes three and four times a day to send
telegrams expressing opposition to the Fallon bill while
Beck made a personal call on Senator Sam Rayburn to
emphasize the teamsters' point of view.

In turn, the

railroads realized that they no longer held Congress's
undivided attention on transportation issues.

Average

motorists, who would save $100 per year in car expenses
under the Fallon proposal, were strangely silent during
congressional debates.15

Their lack of interest in Fallon's

plan, coupled with the vigorous action of the multi-faceted
opposition lobby, proved too much for the railroads.

On

July 27, 1955, the House of Representatives defeated the
Fallon bill by a 292 to 123 margin.16

15White,

"Where Are Those New Roads?" 51.

16Congress, House, National Interstate Highway Act, 84th
Congress, 1st session, H. R. 7072, Congressional Record,
vol. 101, no. 9, daily ed. (July 27, 1955), S11717-18.
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The Fallon bill's defeat, however, did not end debate
on the interstate highway program.

Walter Belson of the

American Trucking Association revealed his organization's
perspective when he stated:
Yes, we [the trucking association] had
considerable influence in killing the Fallon bill. But don't
confuse the Fallon bill with the highway program. We're not
such stupid idiots as to be opposed to a road program we
need as much as anyone else. We were the first group to
support the highway program from the beginning . . . we
agreed to accept increased taxes to pay for it— we'll pay
our fair share, the same rate on fuel, tires, and equipment
everyone else pays.17
When Congress reconvened in the fall of 1955, the
interstate highway program still had numerous supporters
willing to work toward a compromise.

William Noorlag, Jr.,

general manager of the Central Motor Freight Association,
expressed his industry's frustration with the railroads'
attempts to make truckers fight highway legislation.
Noorlag believed that the railroads wanted truckers to
oppose the highway program "so that truckers would be blamed
for killing the highway measure which the scheming railroads
had set out to do by hook or crook."

But he was also

optimistic that "the Senate committees [could] restore
equity and reality to the tax increase measure."18
Eventually, Fallon and Representative Hale Boggs of
Louisiana fashioned a bill that conformed to Belson and

17White, "Where Are Those New Roads?" 50.
18Quotations from Noorlag appear in Rose, Interstate,
85.
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Noorlag's prerequisites.

The bill did not change the

highway program's original purpose as outlined by the Clay
committee.

The interstate highway system was the measure's

centerpiece and this proposal also provided funds for
construction without asking significant sacrifices from any
highway lobby members.

The new bill cut the Fallon plan's

taxes on gasoline and diesel in half; Fallon and Boggs
reduced the tax increase on rubber from 10 to 15 cents per
pound to 3 cents; they included a 2 percent hike in the
excise tax on new trucks, trailers, and buses, and trucking
interests accepted a $1.50 per thousand pounds surcharge on
the total weight of trucks heavier than thirteen tons.19
The last provision gained acceptance because in 1952, just
10 percent of all trucks on the road weighed as much as nine
tons.

Thus, the last additional tax would not affect the

vast majority of the nation's truckers.20
Like the Clay committee's proposal, the Fallon-Boggs
bill also stipulated that the federal government would pay
90 percent of the new interstate system's construction
costs.

The government would also distribute $25 billion

according to local needs, but correcting urban congestion
problems would cost the most money and, therefore, would

19See "Federal Highway Act of 1956," (Public Law 627,
June 29, 1956) 70 United States Statues at Large, 374-402
hereafter cited as the "Federal Highway Act of 19 56" for
complete contents of the law.
20"Where Do Trucks Go From Here?" 74.
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receive a disproportionate share of the funds.

Those who

championed highway construction over mass transit to solve
urban traffic problems had succeeded.21
Boggs and Fallon also pleased the Bureau of Public
Roads and others who opposed both the federal and various
state governments' tendency to collect more in highwayrelated taxes than they spent on roads.

The Highway Trust

fund provision of the new bill rectified this problem.

All

money collected from fuel, tire, new vehicle, and surcharge
taxes would be deposited into this fund for road building
and maintenance alone.22
During June 1956, the Fallon-Boggs proposal sailed
through Congress.

The bill passed by an eighty-nine to one

margin in the Senate; the House of Representatives held a
voice vote on the measure and did not bother to record its
final tally.

On July 29, President Eisenhower signed the

Federal Highway Act into law.23
The package's final version was almost a carbon copy of
the Clay committee's proposal.

Congress even acknowledged

21See "Federal Highway Act of 1956 - Title II, Highway
Revenue Act of 1956," United States Statues At Large, 70,
387-402 for complete financing arrangements.
22Ibid.
23Congress, House, Federal Highway Act of 1956, 84th
Congress, 2d Session, H. R. 10660, Congressional Record,
vol. 102, no. 8, daily ed. (June 26, 1956), S10969, H11004.
When Congress calls for a voice vote on a bill and does not
record the final tally, it can generally be assumed that the
bill in question had overwhelming support.
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the perceived importance of the highway program's civil and
national defense features.

The Federal Highway Act of 1956

stipulated that "because of its primary importance to the
national defense, the name of [the interstate system] is
hereby changed to the National System of Interstate and
Defense Highways."24
After recovering from a heart attack, President
Eisenhower played a key role in winning the highway bill's
approval.

In 1954, he had appointed the Clay committee,

thus making highway improvement an issue.

Two years later,

the Eisenhower administration and Congress compromised with
trucking interests on additional taxation, believing that
building the interstate system would help create both shortand long-term economic prosperity.

The thousands of

construction jobs generated would achieve the former, while
providing both the motorist and trucker with a quicker,
safer means of reaching their vacation sites and delivery
destinations would accomplish the later objective.25
Eisenhower was jubilant when informed of the bill's passage.
He spoke of the great step taken to improve the nation's
transportation system.

The president also took pleasure in

describing the enormous construction project necessary to

24"Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956," United States
Statues at Large, 70, 378.
25For a discussion of Eisenhower's involvement in
gaining the bill final approval, see Rose, Interstate, 8595.
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build the interstate highway system.

He declared that "the

amount of concrete poured to form these roadways would build
eighty Hoover Dams or six sidewalks to the moon."26
Others, however, were not so enthusiastic.

City

planner and author Lewis Mumford's appraisal of the
interstate program went as follows: "the most charitable
thing to assume about this action is that they [Congress and
the administration] hadn't the
they were doing."

faintest notion of what

Mumford was also prophetic when he wrote

that "by the time they find out it will be too late to
correct all the damage to our cities and countryside done
by . . . this ill-conceived and preposterously unbalanced
program.1,27
In The Nation, David Cort outlined how "a single bus or
train takes between twenty and one thousand cars off the
roads."

Cort advocated more spending on buses and railways

but he saw urban traffic as so overwhelming that drastic
measures were needed.

He argued that "The privilege of

driving a car must be made immensely more honorable and
exclusive.

License examinations must be rigorous."

Cort

also called for license suspensions "at the first indication
of driving incompetence and that the suspension period ought
to be in terms of years, not weeks."

Cort went on to

26Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 548.
27Lewis Mumford, The Highway and the City (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1956), 234.
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conclude that "the automobile had converted the descendants
of the American pioneers, the toughest most energetic and
open-minded people in the civilized world, into lazy, fatseated invalids."28
These objections, though, were out of touch with the
administration's perception, which saw the new highways as a
progressive measure to solve transit problems.

Implicit in

Eisenhower's reasoning was his administration's realization
that the future of commercial freight transportation was in
the trucking, not the railroad industry.

Fifty years

earlier, railroads successfully gained federal regulation of
their industry not because of progressive hostility toward
monopolistic business practices, but because Congress and
three presidents from both political parties realized that
economic prosperity depended on the railroads' stability.
By 1956, however, railroads were no longer essential to
American economic success.

Regulation and the trend toward

automotive transportation damaged the industry to the point
where its opinions and needs no longer carried much weight
with Congress or the Eisenhower administration.

Both

branches of government simply believed that the country's
long-term interests would be better served by accommodating
the wishes of the diesel, oil, and, especially, the trucking
industries over those of the railroads.

The dynamics of the

28David Cort, "Our Strangled Highways," The Nation,. 182
(April 28, 1956), 360.
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relationship between business and government had not changed
in fifty years; government was still willing to consider
business concerns before worrying about the welfare of any
other segment of society.

In 1956, the triumvirate of

diesel, oil, and trucking represented America's economic
future.

These industries used their influence to defeat a

bill that would have produced an interstate system at an
unacceptable price.

When the dust cleared after the Fallon

bill's defeat, these three industries created enough support
to pass a highway bill on their terms.

In 1956, business

interests were still of paramount concern to the federal
government when formulating transportation policy, but the
businesses involved had changed.

CONCLUSION
Business interests did triumph over opponents of the
interstate highway system.

The trucking industry's victory

demonstrated the strength of the relationship that had
developed between business and government during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

During the 1950s,

the trucking industry and its allies were willing to ask for
government assistance and allow government interference
within an economic system that supposedly championed free
enterprise.

At the turn of the century, the railroads had

been willing to ask for the same things.

Moreover, the

federal government expressed an interest in guarding the
interests of key industries throughout the first half of the
twentieth century.
Recognizing this long-term relationship between
business and government suggests an alternative way of
periodizing modern American history.

Historians of the late

nineteenth and twentieth centuries have divided this time
period into small, neatly partitioned sections based largely
upon major political and economic events and trends.
Reconstruction, the Gilded Age, the Progressive Era, World
War I, the Roaring 192 0s, the Great Depression, and World
War II constitute the standard pre-1945 periodization.
76
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post-war years are usually divided by decade or presidential
administration, with the Second World War acting as a great
divide that separates the post-war era from all that
preceded it.1
These five- and ten-year periods encourage historians
to focus their research on one of these extremely small
segments.

The resultant scholarship, therefore, has

reinforced and strengthened the standard periodization, but
this method of dividing the late nineteenth and twentieth
centuries has also created serious problems.

First and

foremost among these problems is the lack of unifying trends
and themes that cover significant portions of this time
period. The challenge, then, is to construct interpretive
frameworks that attempt to identify and understand long-term
change and continuity.2
The development of the relationship between business

William Chafe's work emphasizes the importance of
World War II in transforming American society. See William
H. Chafe, The Paradox of Change: American Women in the
Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991)
and Chafe, The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War
II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
2Some historians of the late nineteenth and twentieth
centuries have moved beyond the limitations created by the
standard periodization. These works have focused on a
variety of topics. See, for instance, Emily Rosenberg,
Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural
Expansion, 1890-1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982);
Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and
the Reconstruction of Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987); George Chauncey, Gay New
York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making of the Gay Male
World, 1890-1940 (New York: Basic Books, 1994).
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and government during the first half of the twentieth
century provides such a framework.

The Second Industrial

Revolution helped create big businesses like the railroads
and also spawned high levels of competition within these
industries.

Industrial capitalism also helped plug farmers

on the newly-settled Great Plains into the world market
economy, but selling their produce on the national and
international market had unforeseen consequences.

Mid-

Western farmers found themselves depending on banks and
railroad companies that charged unreasonable interest rates
and shipping fees.

Dissatisfaction with these developments

led to the Populist Revolt of the 1890s and the rural reform
politics of the Progressive Era.

Mid-Western farmers and

other shippers turned to the government for assistance in
establishing equitable business relationships with the
nations' railroads.

Some railroads, however, sought to turn

reform efforts in their favor by supporting regulation that
helped eliminate the competition that had made the railroad
industry so unstable during the closing decades of the
nineteenth century.

Both Congress and the Progressive Era's

presidents knew that the locomotive was an essential part of
American economic success.

Punishing railroad companies

with regulation designed solely for the benefit of farmers
and other shippers would jeopardize future economic security
and prosperity.

Thus, the biggest, strongest railroads

largely succeeded in establishing a body of federal
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regulatory law that helped stabilize the industry while
significantly increasing profits.
The Progressive Era established a relationship between
transportation interests and government that remained in
place during the following decades.

This relationship

changed, however, as other methods of transportation
developed.

Regulation had stabilized the railroad industry,

but it also made railroad companies unresponsive to
competition.

This inflexibility enabled the trucking

industry to strip the railroads of larger and larger
portions of their freight-hauling business between 1920 and
1940.
At the same time, state and federal highway officials
exercised increasing influence over road construction
policy.

The Bureau of Public Roads along with many state

highway departments lobbied successfully for more highway
construction.

The automobile's popularity helped marshall

support for road construction, but a new lobby composed of
businesses related to highway travel also increasingly
influenced the federal government's transportation policies.
During the decade following World War II, the trucking
and

automobile industries usurped the railroads from their

primary position in providing transportation.

As a result,

the railroads lost their distinction as a vital force in the
American economy, and thus lost a great deal of their
influence in the halls of Congress and the executive branch.

80
As during the Progressive Era, the federal government wished
to promote the interests of vital businesses.

Building the

interstate highway system was a way of doing just that for
the industries that had taken over American transportation.
Looking at the rise of automotive transportation over a
seventy-five year period produces a fuller understanding of
the relationship between business and government and how it
helped produce the railroads' decline while promoting the
simultaneous ascent of the truck and automobile.

This

interpretive framework also charts a new period in modern
America history that might be called the Rise of the
Corporate State.

By connecting the Progressive Era to the

immediate post-World War II years to reveal both continuity
and change, this new period also rejects the standard
periodization's tendency to view the post-war era as
fundamentally different from the decades leading up to the
Second World War.
This thesis concentrates mainly on the political
developments that produced the interstate highway system and
a transportation network dependent on the automobile, but
other topics related to these issues would also re-orient
twentieth-century periodization.

For instance, automobiles

became a class signifier for middle- and upper-class
Americans during the first half of the twentieth century.
These Americans gained the economic wherewithal to provide
their own transportation while the poorer, mostly immigrant
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and black residents of the inner city continued to rely on
public transportation.

Hence, automobiles became a vehicle

for class separation and the interstate highway system could
be viewed as a project that strengthened those class
barriers.
Automobile ownership could also be seen as a method of
indicating class membership.

In the increasingly mobile

world of twentieth-century America, it became more difficult
to demonstrate economic and social status.

How could people

effectively display class affiliation when they traveled to
distant places populated by strangers?

The make and model

of one's automobile became an important indicator of the
owner's economic status.

The automobile, which helped

create a more mobile society and, in turn, created the
problem of indicating class status, also helped solve that
problem by clearly exhibiting the owner's economic class.
This view of the automobile's popularity among middleand upper-class Americans moves beyond the twentieth
century's standard periodization to encompass the entire
period between approximately 1900 and 1960.

This new period

might be called the Making of a Middle-Class Identity.
Attaching the display of class status to automobile
ownership and the automobile's popularity links the general
economic prosperity of the early twentieth century with the
post-World War II economic boom that significantly expanded
the country's middle-class population.

This approach
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reveals that the massive production and acquisition of
consumer goods after World War II had its roots in the
development of a consumer culture during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.

In other words, the twenty

years centering on 1900 produced a consumer mentality that
helped create the economic boom following World War II.3
These are only a few examples of how to apply
interpretive frameworks that re-periodize the post-civil War
era.

Developing a new periodization will require historians

to think broadly about their topics, and, in the process,
pay stricter attention to determining the origins of events
and problems.

Thinking broadly means putting aside the

major political and economic events that historians have
30n the development of consumer culture, see David
Potter, People of Plenty: Abundance and the American
Character (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); T.
J. Jackson Lears, No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the
Transformation of American Culture, 1880-1920 (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1981); Richard Wightman Fox and T. J.
Jackson Lears, eds., The Culture of Consumption: Critical
Essays in American History, 1880-1980 (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1983); Simon J. Bronner, ed.,
Consuming Visions: Accumulation and Display of Goods in
America, 1880-1920 (New York: W. W. Norton, Inc., 1989).
Some historians argue that the rise of consumer culture can
be traced back to mid-eighteenth century and earlier. See
Cary Carson, "The Consumer Revolution in Colonial America:
Why Demand?" in Cary Carson, Ronald Hoffman, and Peter J.
Albert, eds., Of Consuming Interests: The Style of Life in
the Eighteenth Century (Charlottesville, Virginia:
University of Virginia Press, 1994), 483-697.
On the post-World War II economic boom and middle-class
expansion, see John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958); Loren Baritz, The Good
Life: The Meaning of Success for the American Middle Class
(New York: Random House, 1982); Kenneth T. Jackson,
Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).
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used to demarcate the post-Civil War era.

Twentieth century

historical scholarship's concentration on political and
economic history has kept the field from reaching its full
potential.

Students and scholars alike often complain that

studies dealing with the twentieth century pale in
comparison to the scholarship produced on the nineteenth
century and the colonial period.
these earlier time periods?

What is so different about

First, both have standard

periodizations that are much looser than the twentieth
century's.

Historians divide the nineteenth century into

three segments: The revolutionary era of the late eighteenth
to early nineteenth centuries, the early republic, and the
ante-bellum period.

Different colonial historians organize

colonial history in different ways while some deny that any
type of standard periodization exists.
These approaches encourage colonial and nineteenth
century historians to develop topics that cover wider
expanses of time.

Furthermore, scholars of these time

periods are not bound by a periodization that consistently
highlights political and economic events and trends.

The

result is that nineteenth century and colonial historians
have stopped paying strict attention to political and
economic history.

This move toward social and cultural

history reflects a trend that has been going on within the
entire historical profession for the last twenty years.
Indeed, the future of history lies in studying social and
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cultural interaction and development.
What is at stake, then, is the future of twentieth
century history.

It would be irresponsible to eliminate

political history when studying a century where the power
and influence of the state dramatically increased.

The

challenge is to move away from strict political and economic
history and move toward incorporating social and cultural
developments into twentieth-century historical scholarship.
Such scholarship would address, for instance, how a society
and culture increasingly influenced and shaped by state
actions reacted to state control.

These studies will also

help move twentieth century historical scholarship into the
twenty-first century.
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